Iran Update, December 16, 2025

Developments in Iran and Syria, as well as news from the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, are outlined below.

**Iran**

A newly formed coalition of Baloch organizations, the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), released a video on December 11, 2025, urging Iranians to protest against the current regime. The MPF, established on December 10, comprises Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization active in southeastern Iran—and several other Baloch groups.

The MPF has called upon Baloch Muslims and all Iranians who seek freedom to engage in civil actions. These actions include displaying the MPF flag, sharing the organization's charter, and writing anti-regime slogans in public places to show solidarity. The MPF clarified that its flag is not intended to replace the Iranian national flag or the symbols of other Baloch movements. The group also emphasized the need for security precautions during protest activities, such as awareness of surveillance, using safe routes, and employing secure communication methods. Furthermore, the MPF stated its intent to confront the regime through various means, including legitimate defense, political activities, media engagement, and diplomatic efforts. This messaging suggests the MPF aims to gain legitimacy within Iran through sustained civil mobilization, public displays, and coordinated political and media strategies.

Iranian oil exports experienced a slight decrease between October and November 2025. According to United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), Iran exported approximately 61.3 million barrels of oil in November, averaging about 2.04 million barrels per day (bpd). Similarly, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), citing Tanker Trackers, reported Iranian exports of around 61.8 million barrels in November, averaging roughly 2.06 million bpd. In contrast, Iranian oil exports averaged around 2.3 million bpd between the second week of October and the first week of November. Iran exported oil to countries including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Malaysia, reportedly offering a 5 to 10 percent discount on its oil prices in November.

**Syria**

Syrian security forces apprehended a cell of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters in northern Idlib Province. This cell had conducted at least three attacks targeting Syrian government forces along the M5 highway since November 28, 2025. On December 16, Syrian Interior Ministry forces detained eight members of the ISIS cell in Maarat al Numan, Idlib Province. The fighters confessed to participating in three recent drive-by shootings along the M5 highway in northern Idlib and southern Aleppo provinces. These attacks targeted Syrian government forces or personnel, resulting in the deaths of one soldier from the 74th Division, two Syrian customs officers, and four Interior Ministry officers. CTP-ISW had assessed on December 4 that attacks along the M5 indicated that active ISIS cells could continue targeting Syrian government forces in the area. Syrian forces seized explosives, silencers, and machine guns from the arrested cell, which could have been used in future attacks.

While this cell may have been operating in the southern Aleppo-northern Idlib countryside for some time, its three most recent attacks coincide with an increase in ISIS attacks targeting Syrian government forces since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10. A BBC Salafi-jihadi expert noted on December 13 that high-profile Islamic State (IS) supporters have encouraged ISIS sympathizers to conduct attacks against the Syrian transitional government whenever and wherever possible since Syria joined the Global Coalition. Since November 10, ISIS has increased both the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory. The Interior Ministry’s arrest of the ISIS cell in Maaran Numan follows an ISIS-aligned or -affiliated gunman’s attack on US and Syrian forces in Palmyra, Homs, on December 13, which resulted in the deaths of two US servicemembers, one civilian interpreter, and one Syrian officer.

Senior Kurdish officials involved in negotiations with the Syrian government have observed a shift in Turkey's approach toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its integration into the Syrian state. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi stated on December 13 that neighboring countries are not as hostile as before toward the SDF and that the SDF’s presence is no longer an excuse for war. Abdi was almost certainly referring to Turkey, which has used the presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) within the SDF to label the SDF as a terrorist organization and conduct multiple offensives targeting the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish government has maintained this policy toward the SDF since the fall of the Assad regime, emphasizing that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state to avoid posing a threat to Turkish interests. Abdi’s remarks suggest he believes Turkey has softened this stance, particularly given his consistent warnings about Turkish political and military intervention in Syria during the months-long negotiation process between the SDF and the Syrian government. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations Department Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed also noted on December 6 that Turkey’s peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey have resulted in fewer attacks in northern and eastern Syria, where Turkey previously launched frequent airstrikes targeting alleged PKK targets.

Any easing of Turkey’s position toward the SDF is noteworthy, considering Turkish media's circulation of threats that Turkey plans to conduct a military operation against the SDF if it does not integrate into the Syrian state by December 31, 2025. That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. Turkish officials have not indicated any potential relaxation of demands regarding the SDF’s integration. Turkey has consistently demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian Army on an individual basis, not as units, and refuses to allow YPG commanders to assume senior positions within the army.

**Palestinian Territories & Lebanon**

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has assessed that Hezbollah has likely not rebuilt its military capabilities and weapons stockpiles to the point where it could launch a large-scale attack on Israel at this time. The IDF assessment, issued December 16, indicates that Hezbollah currently possesses only one-fifth of the arms it held on October 7, 2023. It remains unclear what weaponry is included in this assessment and to what extent Hezbollah has rearmed, given varying statistics in Israeli intelligence reports. This assessment comes amid Israeli reports that Hezbollah is rapidly reconstituting its weapons stockpiles through smuggling and domestic production. The IDF did not clarify if its assessment pertained only to Hezbollah’s ability to launch a large-scale attack from southern Lebanon or from anywhere within Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s concentrated efforts to smuggle and rebuild its capabilities in northern Lebanon suggest that it does not seek to rebuild its offensive capabilities in southern Lebanon to a level that would provoke an Israeli operation in Lebanon. Israeli officials stated on December 16 that Hezbollah is focusing most of its rearmament activity north of the Litani River, including in the Beirut area and the Bekaa Valley, rather than in areas along the Israel-Lebanon border. Syrian forces have interdicted several suspected Hezbollah weapons shipments in Syria in recent months, primarily in locations adjacent to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and other Hezbollah strongholds in northern Lebanon. Hezbollah has reportedly moved its heavy and medium-range weapons from southern Lebanon to areas north of the Litani River to avoid testing Israeli red lines. Hezbollah also reportedly no longer maintains visible permanent positions or outposts in southern Lebanon. The IDF previously assessed in November 2025 that Hezbollah is several months away from crossing Israel’s red line regarding offensive capabilities. Israeli officials have continued to indicate that any deployment of high-quality weapons or detection of Hezbollah activity south of the Litani River would be met with a direct Israeli response.