America’s Drone Delusion

The rapid proliferation of drone warfare in Ukraine has captured the attention of Western militaries. Since 2023, both Russia and Ukraine have deployed millions of inexpensive quadcopter drones. These drones account for a significant portion of battlefield casualties in some areas, reaching as high as 70%. Russia uses Geran-2 and Geran-3 one-way attack drones for nightly strikes on Ukrainian cities. Ukraine also employs its own drones to strike Russian bases and infrastructure.

These developments have led many Western defense strategists to advocate for a shift in military priorities. President Trump signed an executive order in June to boost drone production. The Department of Defense has since made policy changes to integrate low-cost drones into the U.S. arsenal. Defense Secretary Hegseth has called for the U.S. to achieve “drone dominance.” Companies like Anduril, Palantir, and Shield AI are vying for defense contracts related to uncrewed military technologies. Small uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) have altered infantry combat, and the U.S. Army lags behind Russia and China in both UAS and counter-UAS technologies.

That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. the assumption that acquiring AI-enabled drones will strengthen U.S. defenses against China is a mistake. Lessons from the war in Ukraine, an attritional conflict between land-based forces, don't translate to other conflicts. China's military and potential confrontations in the Indo-Pacific require different strategies. Despite leading in drone technology, China prioritizes crewed military hardware, receiving numerous advanced combat aircraft, warships, and missile systems annually. Overemphasizing drone development risks losing the U.S.'s edge in air force and navy capabilities, which are crucial in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

The Limits of Drone Warfare

Military analysts and defense industry executives have emphasized lessons from Ukraine's defense against Russia. This has led to a surge of new defense products marketed as "transformational," based on combat use in Ukraine. That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. many of these systems, especially Western-made drones, have proven ineffective against Russian electronic warfare and harsh conditions.

The war in Ukraine differs significantly from potential conflicts involving the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific. The Russian invasion of Ukraine features long, sparsely manned frontlines. Neither side has achieved air superiority, diminishing the importance of airpower. Both sides suffered losses early in the war, preventing large-scale combined arms maneuver warfare since mid-2023. As a result, both armies rely on small infantry units with tank, artillery, and drone support for probing attacks against fixed defensive lines.

In these conditions, short-range, lightweight, cheap quadcopter drones have been effective. With conventional artillery ammunition becoming scarce, both sides use drones to inflict attrition and suppress enemy movements within 6-12 miles of the frontlines. Frontline combat is dominated by drones and new technologies like fiber-optic drones and AI-assisted guidance. Counter-drone defenses like netting, jamming, and specialized ammunition are also critical. That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. these defenses are stretched thin due to the dispersed forces and constant attrition.

That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. the expansion of drone warfare isn't the primary reason Ukrainian forces struggle to hold positions. Instead, Russian heavy glide bombs, delivered by Su-34 fighter bombers, pose a greater threat. These bombs can destroy fortified positions more effectively than small drones, and Ukraine lacks the means to intercept the launch aircraft. While drones inflict attrition, glide bomb attacks are more dangerous to dug-in troops, impacting strategic locations like Chasiv Yar.

Indo-Pacific Realities

Unlike Ukraine, any conflict between the U.S. and China would primarily occur in the air and at sea, with land combat limited to islands like Taiwan. U.S. success depends on projecting airborne and maritime firepower across vast distances against advanced Chinese threats. This requires trained personnel operating advanced aircraft, bombers, and warships in synchronized operations. The conflict would involve different forces and equipment than those used in Ukraine.

Drones would still be significant in land and amphibious operations in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan could use drones to repel a PLA landing force. Counter-drone capabilities would also be essential to intercept PLA drones. That said, the reality is a bit more complicated. these systems would be useless to the U.S. Air Force and Navy in providing air cover and maritime support from distant bases like Guam.

Distances in the Indo-Pacific are challenging. The limited range of American fighter aircraft (F-22, F-35, and F/A-18E/F) is a major shortcoming against Chinese threats. With combat radii of 350-600 miles, they require aerial refueling, which is risky. Small drones cannot solve this problem. Even long-range FPV drones are limited to around 15 miles. The weapon system that has significantly changed combat in Ukraine would be largely irrelevant in the early phases of a conflict between Chinese and American forces.

Even if small drones could be delivered rapidly across the required ranges, none of the varieties currently in use in Ukraine could effectively defend U.S. forces against Chinese attacks. Beijing already operates thousands of high-end ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles that would be used to strike U.S. forward bases, aircraft carriers, tanker aircraft, and other key large assets. To counter such threats, the U.S. military would unavoidably have to rely on multimillion-dollar missile defense systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3. Intercepting hundreds of increasingly capable Chinese combat aircraft will, likewise, require large quantities of advanced air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-260 JATM and the AIM-174B, as well as the AIM-120D AMRAAM. These will be needed in large quantities regardless of whether they are launched by crewed fighters or, potentially, in the future by AI-enabled uncrewed systems. Small drones simply cannot intercept combat aircraft operating at high altitudes and speeds.

Moreover, the many types of uncrewed systems that would potentially be far more useful in the Indo-Pacific will entail large costs of their own. Stealthy Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs) are expected to cost $20-$30 million apiece. Less ambitious designs will still cost millions. Operating these systems will require personnel for maintenance, logistics, and force protection. CCAs also won't fundamentally change the U.S. military's position relative to the PLA, since China is developing similar systems.

Simpler, one-way attack, decoy, or stand-in jamming drones could be cheaper and perform vital roles within a joint strike package. But even these drones will likely cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to have the required range and performance. AI-enabled swarming behavior may increase effectiveness, but the data links and processing power required will increase unit cost. Weapons that serve much the same purposes already exist in the form of cruise missiles and decoys. The issue is that the United States does not have enough of them.

The Need for Combat Mass

A significant peer conflict will require different resourcing than recent overseas interventions. The U.S. military needs vast stockpiles of ammunition, spare parts, and medical supplies. Washington currently has shortfalls of long-range strike, antiship, and interceptor missiles, and its allies lack them even more. The U.S. also has a shrinking and aging conventional force structure due to deferred modernization. The cost of bringing back “combat mass” has driven a search for AI-enabled technology, including drones, to deliver “cheap mass.”

The PLA, however, has both mass and quality. Despite having the world's largest drone industry, China focuses on acquiring crewed combat aircraft, warships, and advanced missile systems. The PLAAF is projected to have 1,000 J-20s by 2030. China is also building hundreds of advanced antiship and long-range missiles and dozens of advanced destroyers and cruisers per year. Much of this production is going to the PLA and would likely be used in any attempt to capture Taiwan.

While Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighters are being built at a slightly higher rate than China’s J-20A and J-20S, only some of that production is being purchased by the U.S. military. The U.S. Air Force purchased just 48 F-35As in 2025 and plans to purchase fewer than this in each of the remaining years of the current decade. The next generation F-47 fighter, which is expected to cost more than $300 million apiece, is not scheduled to enter U.S. Air Force service until the early 2030s as a production standard combat asset. An equivalent next-generation program for the U.S. Navy, called F/A-XX, will come even later still, assuming the program goes ahead. By that point, however, the next-generation Chinese J-36, J-XDS, and J-50 equivalents, all of which are already in flight testing, will likely also be in service. They may be marginally less capable than the F-47 on a per-aircraft basis but they will likely be produced faster and in greater numbers.

China is also surpassing the U.S. in airborne early warning and command system (AWACS) aircraft. The PLA has roughly 60 modern AWACS, while the U.S. Air Force has only 16 nearly obsolete E-3G Sentry aircraft. Plans to acquire the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail were canceled due to cost overruns and delays. Congress included $400 million to continue the program in the bipartisan bill to end the U.S. government shutdown in November, but even if the program does survive it may be downsized and still faces significant delays. That means that the United States will face an airborne sensor and airborne networking and battle management node gap with China for at least a decade.

There are no easy solutions to the challenge posed by China's growing military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military relies on its air force and navy to deter Chinese aggression. Replicating Ukraine's emphasis on drones won't solve the problem. American decision-makers should focus on addressing gaps in existing air and maritime forces. This requires urgent investment in production capacity and procurement of missiles, combat aircraft, and submarines.

Dealing with these shortfalls will require budget increases or cuts elsewhere. Unless the U.S. maintains air and maritime superiority, its military force structure will struggle to produce relevant combat power against China. Millions of battlefield quadcopters and tens of thousands of one-way attack drones have not enabled Russia to defeat Ukraine, or vice versa. Even if the Pentagon acquires similar capabilities, they will not change its rapidly degrading balance of power with China in the Indo-Pacific.